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The European Union has proposed a Directive to include aviation activities in its 
Emissions Trading Scheme by 2012. A permit allocation method has been announced 
that it is relatively easy to implement and has a low administration cost. However, 
careful scrutiny suggests that the allocation method does not favor energy efficient 
aircraft operators and may undermine efforts to restrict growth of emission from the 
aviation sector. An alternative permit allocation method is proposed in this study 
which favors energy efficient aircraft operators and avoid excessive over competition. 
The proposed method in this study is easy to implement with low administrative cost.  
A Cournot model serves as the theoretical foundation upon which experiments are 
designed to simulate the aviation industry under the proposed emissions trading 
scheme. The equilibrium is calculated for each permit allocation method. Preliminary 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Global warming  
 
The presence of global warming is confirmed by the observations of increased average 
air and ocean temperature and rise of average sea level (IPCC, 2007). The accelerated 
rise of the surface temperature is mainly attributed to the rapid increase of the 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs). Carbon dioxide (CO
2
) is the most important 
anthropogenic GHG and its annual emissions have grown about 80% between 1970 
and 2004 to 38 gigatonnes (Gt). These emissions represented 77% of total 
anthropogenic GHGs emissions
 
in 2004 (ibid).  In 2008, 48% of the total CO2 
emissions were from China and United States as shown in Figure 1.1. However, CO2
 
 
emissions per capita from United States were 3.4 times than the emissions per capita in 
China in year 2008 (see Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.1 CO2
Secondary data retrieved from 












Emissions in Million metric tons
China         6017.69
USA            5902.75
Russia        1704.36
India          1293.17
Japan         1246.76
Germany   857.6
Canada      614.33
UK              585.71
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1.2 Economical instruments to alleviate global warming effect 
 
Numerous researches suggest that controlling the GHGs emissions hinges on two basic 
instruments. These are command-and-control (CAC) and incentive-based (IB) 
regulations (Carlsson and Hammar, 2002; Tietenberg, 1990). Incentive-based 
mechanisms are widely accepted due to higher efficiency and lower cost compared to 
CAC regulations (Baumol and Oates, 1988) in controlling emissions. Incentive-based 
mechanisms can be further divided into two groups: price and quantity controls. 
 
Price controls, such as emission tax, are the simplest method to charge the negative 
environmental externality caused by the polluters. Therefore, price controls are one of 
the most widely used economic instruments in environment protection. However, due 
to the lack of certainty in controlling the overall amount of pollution, 























price controls are not favored due to the uncertainty in effectiveness.  
 
Quantity control in the form of an emissions trading scheme, is also known as cap-
and-trade systems. In contrast to price controls, where the total amount of pollution is 
uncertain, the cap of pollution quota ensures that the pollution does not exceed a 
certain amount. In quantity control, cap-and-trade systems overcome the above 
shortcoming through trading of allowances. The allocation of allowances is associated 
with emission rights. Given the possibly windfall profits and the flexibility in 
implementation, cap-and-trade is favored by government, environmentalists and 
industry. 
 
1.3 International efforts on mitigating GHGs emissions 
 
The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997) committed industrialized countries commit to 
decrease emissions of six types GHGs by 5.2% below 1990’s level over the period 
2008-2012. The EU has also set medium and long term targets to restrict the GHGs 
emissions. By 2020, EU aims to reduce 20% emissions below 1990’s level. The long 
term goal is to stabilize the CO2
 
 at 450-550 parts per million by volume (ppmv) by 
2050 (Anderson et al, 2005). 
1.4 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest multi-
national emissions trading scheme in the world (Ellerman, 2007) aiming at achieving 
the target set by the Kyoto protocol. Aggregated emissions caps are imposed on the 
most energy-intensive sectors such as cement, glass, ceramics, paper, steel and iron, 
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and power generation. Together these sectors consist of more than 10,000 installations 
which are collectively responsible for half amount of the CO
2 
 
emissions and 40% of 
total greenhouse gas emissions in EU (MEMO/08/35, 2008). 
In January 2008, a number of changes for the scheme had been proposed by the 
European Commission, including introduction of a centralized allowance allocation by 
an EU authority replacing the member governments, an increase share of auction 
rather than allocating freely by grandfathering approach and most importantly, 
extending the scheme to include aviation industry. 
 
1.5 Emissions from aviation and including its emission into EU ETS 
 
Figure 1.3 shows that emissions from the transport sector contribute 23% of the total 
emissions in EU-27 region in 2007. Moreover, emissions from transport continuously 
increased over 17 years while emissions from other sectors have been stable below 
1990’s level (see Figure 1.4). Although, the emissions from civil aviation within EU-
27 contributed to 2%  share in transport sector, the world aviation activities accounted 
for approximately 3% of anthropogenic global warming in 2004 (Enerdata, 2007; EEA, 
2009).  
 
Despite the fact that GHGs emissions from other forms of transportation have 
stabilized in recent years, aviation constitutes one of the fastest growing sectors and 
emissions continue to increase (USGAO, 2000). Global air passenger traffic (revenue 
passenger-kms) has increased by 9% per annum since 1960 which is 2.4 times of the 
growth rate of global mean GDP (IPCC, 1999). By 1997, growth rate in global air 
passenger traffic had slowed to approximately 5% per year due to a matured aviation 
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industry in some parts of the world. This growth rate is now expected to be sustained 
until 2015. The high growth rate of aviation industry implies high growth rate of 
GHGs emissions. In the European Union, CO
2 
 
emissions from international aviation 
increased by 85% between 1990 and 2004, higher than maritime emissions or land 




 emissions by Sector EU-27 Million tons in 2007 (EEA, 2009) 
Figure 1.4 Change of CO2
*Excluding LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry) Emissions and International Bunkers 
 emissions* among sectors compared to 1990’s level in EU-27 (EEA, 2009) 
** Excluding International Bunkers (international traffic departing from the EU) 






















Given the target to stabilize CO
2 
emissions at 450ppmv by 2050 in the EU, the 
proportion of total carbon emissions from aviation is set at 79% by 2050. If the 
corresponding target is changed to 550ppmv by 2050, the proportion will be reduced 
to 39% (Anderson, 2005). Simulations show that aircraft emissions in the absence of 
any restriction will account for the majority of CO
2 
 
emissions covered by the EU ETS. 
This will make it difficult to meet the EU reduction target of 20% below 1990’s level 




July 2008 the European Parliament (EP) decided to include aviation in the EU 
ETS. The EC Directive (Directive 2008/101/EC) encompasses the following key 
elements:  
(1) The EU ETS will include all flights departing from or landing at the EU airports 
from 2012. Aircraft operators will be obliged to comply with the regulation to 




(2) In 2012, the total quantity of allowances to be allocated to aviation sector will be 
97% of the historical aviation emission which is the average total emission level in 
2004-2006. This emissions cap will be decreased to 95% in 2013. 
 
(3) Allowances will be allocated to each aircraft operator in proportion to tonne-
kilometers flown during the reference year in 2010. The benchmark will be calculated 
from dividing the EU-wide cap for aviation sector by the total tonne-kilometres flown 
in reference year by all aircraft operators included in the EU ETS. The first reference 
 7 
 
year will be 2010. Thereafter, the reference years will be the calendar year ending 24 
months before the beginning of next trading period.  
 
(4) In the first year of inclusion of aviation into the EU-ETS, Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs)
 
and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)
 
 
from the Clean 
Development Mechanism and the Joint Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol may be 
used up to 15% of an aircraft operator's EU ETS allocation in 2012.  
(5) Allowances allocated to aircraft operators will be only valid within the aviation 
sector. For example, allowance in aviation sector cannot be sold to other trading 
sectors except with the aviation sector. However, additional allowances can be 
purchased from other sectors by aviation sectors under EU ETS. 
 
(6) Allowances not used in 2012 can be ‘banked’ to the third trading period of the EU 
ETS which implies unused allowances can be carried over for use up to 2020.  
 
(7) A special reserve consisting of 3% of allowances will be established for new 
entrants and fast growing aircraft operators. 
 
1.6 Literature review and motivation 
 
There are several studies on the EU ETS and the aviation sector. These include 
variability of coverage of GHGs, geographical scope, allocation method, monitoring 
method, verification mechanism and trading entities in effectiveness of controlling 
emissions which are discussed by Wit et al. (2005). Mendes and Santos (2008) studied 
the impact on both supply and demand impacts in aviation industry and Anger (2010) 
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estimated the impacts of including aviation in EU ETS on air transport output and 
macroeconomic effects. Scheelhaase et al. (2010) studied the impacts on competition 
between European and non-European network aircraft operators.  
 
Wit compared the pros and cons for variant frames, and suggested that the future 
frame should integrate the following principles: (1) market access for new entrants, (2) 
compatibility with the polluter-pays principle, (3) credits for early action, and (4) data 
availability.  
 
Mendes and Santos estimated the impacts from the perspective of supply and demand. 
The results suggest that the impacts are likely to be minimal due to the high abatement 
cost and inelastic demand. Anger demonstrated the impacts on both air transport 
output and macroeconomics are negligible. The E3ME model estimated that there 
would be nearly 7.4% reductions of CO
2 
 
emissions incorporating the aviation into EU 
ETS. Furthermore Scheelhaase et al. concluded that non-European network aircraft 
operators would gain a significant competitive advantage compared to European 
network aircraft operators. This is because non-European network aircraft operators 
tend to operate relatively efficient long-haul services into Europe. European network 
aircraft operators instead, have a relative inefficient short-haul feeder network within 
the scope of the ETS. 
This study analyzes the impact of different allowances allocation method on the 
aircraft operators. Different allowances allocation methods such as grandfathering, 
benchmarking, auctioning, baseline and even for no allocation plan have been 
discussed. With the comparison, Wit et al. concluded that benchmarking approach is 
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the most preferred method for aviation industry. Grandfathering apparently contradicts 
the polluter-pays principle, although it is attractive to emitters, because it favors vested 
interests (Cramton and Kerr, 2002; Cames and Deuber, 2004). In addition, baseline 
approach has significant drawbacks which are unfavorable for new entrants and 
aircraft operators which achieve a remarkable emissions reduction (Wit et al., 2005). 
Lastly, despite being the most efficient option, the auction approach places too much 
burden on the aircraft operators. Hence, benchmarking approach is adopted as the 
preferred allocation method in EU Directive. 
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The EU method has many advantages. The biggest merit of EU method is easy to 
implement with a low administration cost. However, careful scrutiny suggests that the 
EU method does not favor aircraft operators with high energy efficiency. If energy 
efficiency level is defined as the ratio of Tonne-Kilometers over quantity of fuel 
consumed (see Table 2.2). Under the EU method, aircraft operators have strong 
incentives to increase their market share during Benchmark period in order to receive 
more free allowances in the ETS period. This may result in over competition for 
market share and undermine the efforts of containing the emission growth rate in 
aviation sector. An alternative allowances allocation method, which will be referred as 
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Augmented EU Emissions Trading Scheme or AEU ETS, is proposed which favors 
energy efficient aircraft operators where there is no incentive to compete in market 
share to receive allowances. Further, the AEU ETS is easy to implement with a low 
administrative cost because the data required is already available. 
 
Aircraft operators in the United States perceived this as an act of exclusion and 
containment in the EU aviation market. The EU Directive has resulted in strong 
international resistance, from the United States and other countries such as Canada, 
Australia, China and Japan, because such exclusion is incompatible with the Chicago 
Convention. 
 
The various allocation methods have not been subject to empirical evaluation. Few 
experiments have been carried out to test the responses of participants in a laboratory 
environment. Experiments are designed in this study to simulate responses to different 
allocation methods. The Cournot framework forms the bases of evaluation and the 




2. The Model 
 
2.1 Details of including aviation activities in EU ETS 
 
Based on the Directive, the allowances allocation method can be expressed in the 
following way: 
 








periodbenchmark  in the operatorsaircraft  allby flown  kilometers-tonne
periodbenchmark  in theoperator aircraft  by theflown  kilometers-tonnecap  wideEU
 
EU wide cap: average emissions from aviation in EU from 2004-2006 
Benchmark period: 2010-2011 
Table 2.1 Illustration of EU allowance allocation method 
EU wide cap 100 
Tonne-Kilometers by one particular aircraft operator 800 
Tonne-kilometers by all aircraft operators 10000 
The allowances located to the aircraft operator are 8
10000
800100 =×  
 
The allowances which are allocated to aircraft operator are based on share of Tonne-
Kilometers flown during the Benchmark period. The plan favors those with large 
market share. Ideally, the method should favor the operators with high energy 
efficiency. High efficient aircraft operators should be granted more allowances. 
Furthermore, under the EU method, the aircraft operator has incentives to increase its 
market share during the Benchmark period to maximize allowances. We proposed the 
AEU ETS method in which allowances are allocated based on energy efficiency in 
place of market share. This encourages the aircraft operators to utilize newer and 
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lighter planes with better engine technology and lighter aircraft weight (Wit et al., 
2005).  
 
2.2 Design of the model 
 
This study incorporates the emissions trading scheme into the basic Cournot model. 
The new Cournot model is used to imitate the competition of aviation industry under 
emissions trading scheme. 
 
In the theoretical model, market is defined as a single LTO (Landing/Take-off cycle) 
and restricted to two players, i.e., two aircraft operators compete in a single route 
based on quantity adjustment. Player i can choose its output (qi) and efficiency level 
(ei
EU ETS, EU
































Table 2.2 Symbols in Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2 
EU Ai Free allowances allocated to aircraft operator i under EU ETS 
AEU Ai Free allowances allocated to aircraft operator i under AEU ETS 
γ  EU wide cap 
q Output (No. of Tonne-Kilometers) chosen by player i i 
e Efficiency level chosen by player i which is defined as a ratio of  Tonne-
Kilometers over Quantity of fuel consumed 
i 
consumed fuel of Tonne
Kilometers-Tonne of No.ei =  
 







for other sectors is trading between a narrow range of between 10-30 Euros. Also the 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) in aviation industry is higher than the current 
allowances price (Wit et al., 2005; Mendes and Santos, 2008). The entire aviation 
industry is assumed as a net buyer of the allowances from other industry sector in EU 
ETS. Anger and Köhler (2010) have indicated that the impact of aviation activities on 
the price of allowances is negligible. 
 
Aircraft operators can switch to newer aircraft which employs energy efficient 
technology. However, this may be at the expense of incurring cost. A simple linear 
cost function of efficiency level                        is assumed in this model. It simplifies 
the derivation of the Nash equilibrium solution.  
 
In summary, the model is set up with following prerequisites  
(1) Two players in the market compete against each other in output  
(2) Unit price of allowance is exogenous  
(3) Players in the model are net buyers of the allowances  
(4) Cost function is linear with the efficiency level  
 
Firm i’s profit function under EU ETS and AEU ETS is given in two periods. Period 1 
is the Benchmark period and period 2 is ETS period where firms are included in the 
ETS.  
 
I. Profit function under EU ETS 
 
(a) Benchmark Period 
1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )i i j i i iEU a b q q q e qπ α β = − + − +   Equation 2.3 
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II. Profit function under AEU ETS 
(a) Benchmark Period 
[ ] iiijii qeqqqbaAEU 11111 )()(1 βαπ +−+−=   
 





























   
Subject to the following constraints         
( ) 011 ≤−+ aqqb ji  ,                    
( ) 022 ≤−+ aqqb ji ,  
( ) 0222 ≤−+++ aqqbe jiiβα  
The first two constraints ensure that the unit price of output is positive and Equation 2.9 
ensures that profit is positive prior to purchase of emission allowances. These 
constraints allow an element of reality as it reflects realities of the business world. 
The unit price of allowance under EU ETS and AEU ETS is given in the last element of 














































































The aircraft operator possesses            of permits to comply with the regulation;  
or                    is the  free permits allocated to the aircraft operator according to 
different allocation methods. Since the aviation industry is expected to be the net 




The Nash equilibrium solutions are given below 















Similarly, the response function for player j is  
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γβαπ  d)  
  
 
The Nash equilibrium solution is  
 
 































The response function for player i is  
 
 
Similarly, the response function for player j is  
 
































































































   
 
Solve Equation 2.28 and Equation 2.29, we can obtain 
 
 
Assumptions on the parameters for the experiments are as follows 
a) Unit price of output: ( )ji qqba +−   where, 100=a   1=b        
b) Cost: ieβα +        0=α    2=β  

























2 γ   Unit price of allowance: 50=aP   EU wide cap: 15=γ  
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium solutions are 
I. EU ETS 
35.111 ==
ji qq  7.2622 ==
ji qq  011 ==
ji ee  0.522 ==



















































































II. AEU ETS 
3.3111 ==
ji qq  7.2622 ==
ji qq  0.311 ==
ji ee  0.522 ==
ji ee  
 
During the AEU ETS, output decreases and the efficiency increases during the 
Benchmark period. In addition, the output and efficiency in ETS period remain the 
same regardless the change of allocation method. The efficiency level is directly 
related with Pa and inversely with β. This is because higher Pa will induce greater 
incentive to increase efficiency such that fewer expenses will be incurred for the extra 
permits. On the other hand, the larger β implies higher cost associated with increased 





The model in section 2.2 allows several hypotheses to be tested. The focus is on the 
qualitative behavior of participants when facing different allocation methods. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Output of Benchmark period in EU ETS is greater than output of Benchmark 
period in AEU ETS (Equation 2.18 and Equation 2.30). 
 
This is because EU ETS stimulates greater competition for market share in order to receive 
more free allowances in the subsequent ETS period.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Efficiency level of Benchmark period in EU ETS is less than its counterpart 
of Benchmark period in AEU ETS (Equation 2.11 and Equation 2.22). 
 
This is because participants have no incentive to improve their efficiency level in 
Benchmark period under the EU ETS. In AEU ETS, however, incentive to improve the 
efficiency level in Benchmark period becomes priority as allowances distributed in ETS 
period subject to the efficiency level of both participants in Benchmark period. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Output and efficiency level in ETS period remain no change from EU  
ETS to AEU ETS (Equation 2.10 and Equation 2.20; Equation 2.15 and Equation 2.26). 
 
Since the efficiency and output in ETS period have the same impact on the profit function 
in EU ETS and AEU ETS (see Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.6), the optimal value of 
efficiency and output to maximize the profit function in ETS period remain the same 
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between EU ETS and AEU ETS methods. 
In addition, quantitative analysis will be carried out to test the accuracy of the model’s 





3. The Experiment 
 
 
3.1 Design of the experiment 
 
An experiment was designed to ascertain actual responses from participants. The 
experiment follows a systematic methodology established by many experimental 
economists (Hey, 1991; Bardsley et al., 2009).  
 
Participants were recruited from the student population of the National University of 
Singapore. They are assumed to be incentive-motivated rational entities motivated by 
performance related payoffs. They are assumed to be driven to maximize their self-interests 
(Bardsley et al., 2009). Therefore, the participants’ behavior represents the behavior of 
aircraft operators in the real world because of the similar goal of incentive-driven 
motivation. Furthermore, in order to ensure the incentive-driven motivation, the conversion 
rate is set at a threshold level such that the average earnings of the participants are at least 
equal to or more than what they could have earned from a comparable work performed 
within the university such as working as a research assistant. 
 
Zurich’s z-Tree program (Fischbacher, 2007) was used to conduct the experiments in NUS 
during April 2010 with two experiments. In the first experiment, EU ETS allowances 
allocation method was employed in the emissions trading period. Additionally, the other 
experiment was run which was based on AEU ETS. A total of 128 participants were 
recruited. Each experiment had 64 participants. In both experiments participants were 




3.2 Experimental implementation 
 
The experiments are designed to solicit response to a range of output from 0 to 100 units 
and efficiency level between 0 and 50 units in the Benchmark and ETS periods respectively.  
 
In Benchmark period both participants simultaneously decide on quantities of output and 
efficiency level in their production. After a decision is made the information is submitted. 
Each participant will be informed on the decision made by the other participant in 
Benchmark period. The profit is then calculated and displayed.  
 
In contrast with Benchmark period, in the ETS period, participants need coupons to comply 
with their production. Under EU ETS, free coupons are distributed in the ETS period based 
on the output levels of both firms in the Benchmark period. Under AEU ETS, free coupons 
are distributed to participants based on efficiency levels of both participants during the 
Benchmark period (please refer to Equation 2.2). The number of coupons required in the 
production during ETS period for each participant is determined by the output and 
efficiency level of the participant in the ETS period. If the free coupons received from the 
Benchmark period are less than the coupons required, participant will need to purchase the 
additional coupons from the market to maintain the required number of the coupons. 
Further, the unit price of the coupon is fixed. All products are assumed to be completely 







Figure 3.1 Experimental flow of one round 
 
Participants are able to simulate their decision in each production period such as 
Benchmark period and ETS period before making a decision. The experimental flow of one 
round is shown in Figure 3.1. Given data on other participants decision (quantities of output 
and efficiency level), a profit calculator allows the participant ascertain the outcomes. The 
profit calculator gives qualitative information such as a profit table, which is often used in 
the Cournot experiments (e.g., Holt, 1985). It can assist participants to avoid biases due to 





3.3 Experimental procedures 
 
The personal instruction sheet (Appendix B) was sent to the participants a day before 
the experiment through email. They were also informed through SMS to their mobile 
number. Upon arrival in the lab each participant was assigned t o  a computer terminal 
within a cubicle to keep out ‘noise’. A copy of the personal instruction sheet was 
distributed to each participant as well. 
 
The instructions were re-informed before the start of the experiment followed by a question 
and clarification session. All participants then had to respond to a short paper test 
(Appendix D) before proceeding to the experiments. This mini test was intended to ensure 
participants understand how profits would be calculated in the experiment. The 
experimental dollars that they earned over the 20 periods was converted into Singapore 
dollars at a ratio of 0.0004 (2500 experimental dollars = 1SGD). The maximum  and  
minimum earning  of  the  participants  were  S$  32.3  and  S$  10 respectively while the 
average earnings was S$20.18. These earnings were credited directly into bank accounts 




4. Results and Discussion  
 
A comparison and study between the experimental outcomes and theoretical values have 
been done in this section. Through statistical tests, the accuracy of the theoretical model 
(Cournot model) in predicting experimental outcomes is also examined. Further, the 
experimental results are a proof to evaluate whether the AEU ETS method is able to resolve 
the problems in EU ETS method. 
4.1 Average output in Benchmark period in both methods 
 
Theoretical outcome predicts that the Nash equilibrium output is 35.1 in Benchmark period 
under the EU ETS. The output in Benchmark period under the AEU ETS is predicted as 
31.3. The results generated from the experiment are displayed in Figure 4.1 in which the 
average output of Benchmark period in the EU ETS is greater than the average output of 









Figure 4.2 Whisker plots of output distribution in Benchmark period for both methods 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the variability on the output of Benchmark period for both methods. In 
the EU method the spread of the output is in a relative larger range despite the fact that the 
maximum output located at a moderate level (50) at the first round. From the third round, 
participants started to choose the maximum output level allowed in order to gain more free 
allowances in the ETS period. In the AEU ETS, although the maximum output was 
maintained at 100 in the initial rounds, it quickly dropped to 50 and remained to the last 
round except at round 15 and 16. These observations might be explained by the rising 
awareness of the participants to avoid competing in high output level in the AEU ETS as 
competition at high level output would erode the profit of both players. 
 
Unpaired t test (one-tailed) was conducted to compare the average output in Benchmark 
period for both methods. In Table A.1, the output in Benchmark period from the EU ETS is 
significantly greater than the output in Benchmark period from the AEU ETS. 
 
It is also observed that average outputs of Benchmark period for both methods deviate above 
their Nash equilibrium solutions (see Figure 4.1). Are the deviations significantly different 
from the theoretical prediction? One sample t-tests were used to examine the difference and 
ascertain if this outcome was coincident arising from random sampling. Table A.3 indicates 
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that the majority of the average outputs during the 20 periods differ significantly from the 
hypothetical value (35.11) in the EU ETS. This may be due to the ouput values at 100 which 
may have raised the average output level. The data was tested again by excluding the 
outputs at 100 level. From Table A.4, p values correspondingly increased in most cases. If 
the p value is greater than 0.05, we do not reject the null hypothesis of the average output in 
Benchmark period is 35.11. Although the theory accurately predicts the outcomes in half of 
the cases, it still lacks of the ability to make a consistent prediction for the EU ETS. 
 
The deviations of output in Benchmark period in the AEU ETS from hypothetical value of 
31.3 were studied. We conclude that the difference is not due to the random sampling as 
Table A.5 indicated. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Whisker plots of efficiency distribution in Benchmark period for both methods 
 
4.2 Average efficiency level in Benchmark period in both methods 
 
The average efficiency levels in Benchmark period for both methods are given in Figure 4.1. 
In the EU ETS, the average efficiency level was gradually decreasing over the rounds and 
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approaching to zero as predicted by the model (Equation 2.11). This gradual decrease 
efficiency demonstrates the learning process of the participants as they realized that it was 
optimal to keep efficiency level at zero during the Benchmark period. Average efficiency 
level in Benchmark period in the AEU ETS is greater than the value in the EU ETS. 
Unpaired t-test confirmed that the difference in the average efficiency between the two 
experiments is significant. The results of the unpaired t-test are shown in Table A.2. The 
Figure 4.1 also illustrates the efficiency level in the AEU ETS remains at a relative steady 
state and is close to the theoretical value 3. A one sample t-test in Table A.6 confirms there is 
no reason that the average is significantly different from the theoretical value. The model 
successfully predicts the participants’ choices in efficiency level. 
 
4.3 Average output and efficiency in ETS period in both methods 
 
Average output levels and efficiency levels in ETS period for both methods are shown in 
Figure 4.4. The theoretical quantities for the output and efficiency level are labeled in the 
Figure 4.4 as 26.7 and 5 respectively. The average values of output from both methods are 
close to each other. The similar outcome appears in the efficiency levels as well. The slight 
difference is negligible if a certain degree of experimental errors are allowed. Unpaired t-test 
gives us further confidence that the difference is not significant between two experiments in 
average output level as shown in Table A.7. In addition, Table A.8 provides us the similar 
results that the difference of average efficiency level in both methods is not significant. In 
other words, the discrepancy observed between two experiments is likely due to a 





Figure 4.4 Average output and efficiency in ETS period for both methods 
 
In the EU ETS, the range of output in ETS period, in Figure 4.5, became smaller than the 
range of output of Benchmark period. Also, in the EU ETS the average output in ETS period 
is less than the average output in Benchmark period. These observations are intuitively 
consistent with the logic that that in ETS period from participants have no incentives to 
increase output. They also have to restrain from excessive competition as output need to 
comply with the allowances. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Whisker plots of output distribution in ETS period for both methods 
 
A more stringent hypothesis can be tested to check for the difference between the 
experiment outcomes and theoretical values. Although minority of the outputs in ETS period 
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from EU method is significantly different from the hypothetical value, it shows the 
theoretical model increases its accuracy to forecast actual responses from participants (see 
Table A.9 to Table A.12). The efficiency levels from both methods are close to the Nash 
equilibrium with high degree of closeness as shown in Table A.11 and A.12. 
 
Figure 4.6 Whisker plots of efficiency distribution in ETS period for both methods 
 
4.4 Profit and cost for aircraft operators in both methods 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Average profits for aircraft operator in both methods 
 
During the experiments, the profits earned by the participants were recorded by computer 
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and subsequently the average profits per participant were calculated (see Figure 4.7). The 
average profits earned by aircraft operator are greater in the AEU ETS than under the EU 
ETS. In the Cournot model, the fewer total output, the higher unit output price is. Therefore, 
under the AEU ETS, higher profits are achieved due to fewer output produced in Benchmark 
period. On the other hand, the average cost in the AEU ETS is higher than the cost in the EU 
ETS. The increase of the cost is due to the choice of higher efficiency level during 
Benchmark period. This is observed in Figure 4.8 and 4.9. This result implies that the AEU 
ETS method may result in higher cost for aviation sector in short term. Such higher cost is 
due to purchasing high energy efficiency planes; however, in long term, the high energy 
efficiency planes may lead to low operational cost for aircraft operators as new technology 
aircraft made with new composite material which is lighter and operates on bio-fuels (Norris 
et al., 2005). 
 
After all, the higher revenue can compensate for the higher cost and result in higher profit in 
the AEU ETS. However, the profit is sensitive to the coefficient (i.e. a, b, Pa
 
, γ, α and β) in 
the Cournot model. Further investigation is required to investigate the profit outcome under 
different scenarios. 
 





Figure 4.9 A comparison of the average cost in Benchmark 
Period and ETS period for both methods 
 
4.5 Policy implication  
 
The results of the experiment suggest that under the EU ETS aircraft operators tend to 
increase the output in the Benchmark period in order to establish a larger market share. This 
is because the allocation free allowances during the ETS period is based on market share. In 
addition, there is no incentive to improve their energy efficiency during the Benchmark 
period. This is the major disadvantages for the EU ETS. The AEU ETS seeks to address 
these disadvantages. This is supported by the results of the experiments. First, aircraft 
operators do not ‘over’ compete for the market share during the Benchmark period. Second, 
aircraft operators have immediate incentive to improve energy efficiency during the 
Benchmark period. Therefore, the AEU ETS is an improvement from the original allocation 
method. Further, it is easier to switch from EU ETS to AEU ETS as all information and data 
information required for the switch is ready.  
 
What kind of policies encourages aircraft operators to choose new planes with higher energy 
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efficiency? Besides switching to the AEU ETS, we also recommend another two policies. 
First, a subsidy to the aircraft operator which purchases new planes is a positive policy. This 
policy will accelerate the process of replacing old planes with new planes. Because the total 
emissions cap for aviation sector remains unchanged under the AEU ETS, the allowances 
allocated to each aircraft operator will be the same as in the EU ETS, if all aircraft operators 
select new planes such that all aircraft operators will compete on the same level of efficiency. 
Under such scenario, aircraft operators will be reluctant to change their fleet. A policy of 
subsidy will encourage the aircraft operators to make the change.    
 
Second, an additional tax will also encourage aircraft operators switch to the higher energy 
efficiency technology. A policy can be designed to impose an additional tax on the fuel 
consumed by the old planes, but no tax will be imposed on the fuel which is consumed by 
the high energy efficiency planes. Historically, fuel efficiency increased fastest during the 
1970s (Greene, 1992; Lee et al, 2001.), when oil price increased dramatically; therefore fuel 
cost is main reason for aircraft operators to improve fuel efficiency.  The second policy will 
maintain strong pressure on the aviation sector and make them to achieve continued 




5. Conclusion  
 
The Cournot model has been applied to simulate the aircraft operators’ output and efficiency 
based on the proposed the EU ETS and our AEU ETS. The theoretical model suggests that 
the output is greater and the efficiency should be less during the Benchmark period for the 
EU ETS allowance allocation method compared to the AEU ETS allocation method. In 
addition, the output and efficiency level in the ETS period are not affected by the difference 
in the allocation methods.  
 
A computerized experiment was conducted to ascertain the responses from participants 
towards the change of the allowances allocation method. From the experimental results, the 
output of Benchmark period was significantly greater under the EU ETS allocation method 
compared to the AEU ETS method. Further the results confirmed that the efficiency level of 
Benchmark period in the EU ETS method was less than the efficiency level in the AEU ETS 
method. This evidence supports the prediction of the Cournot model. 
 
Further, the results of ETS period show that the output and the efficiency were not affected 
by the different allocation methods. Such results are also consistent with the prediction in 
the Cournot model. 
 
We also tested for the accuracy of the Cournot model’s prediction on the actual experimental 
outcomes. The consistency between the Nash equilibrium and the experimental results were 
examined by the one sample t-test. Nash equilibrium solution is accordance with the actual 
response in a moderate accuracy. The output and the efficiency level in ETS period from the 
experiment were matched with the Nash equilibrium solutions in both allocation methods. In 
the Benchmark period, however, the model lost accuracy in the estimation of actual outputs 
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which were significantly greater than the theoretical value in both methods. This loss of 
accuracy might be due to the selection space of output being larger than the selection space 
of efficiency (100 units vs. 50 units). 
 
However, the Cournot model can be used as a guide for qualitative analysis to analyze the 
change of output and efficiency level due to the change of allocation methods. Quantitatively, 
the model can provide us a precise baseline if the selection space is relatively small. 
However, if the selection space becomes larger, the model loses its accuracy for example in 
the prediction of the output. 
 
From theoretical and experimental perspective, the AEU ETS method provides a larger 
degree of certainty in curbing output in Benchmark period and offers greater incentives for 
aircraft operators to improve their efficiency. It does not add administrative costs to switch 
because the only additional data required is fuel consumed for aircraft operators. 
 
Fundamentally, the Cournot model produces a workable and simple framework to stimulate 
the aviation industry in the laboratory environment. However, such model and the 
experiment cannot completely reflect reality. In the most cases, more than two aircraft 
operators compete in the market and the cost function is unlikely to be linear. And in the 
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Unpaired t test (one-tailed) EU method vs. Amended EU method 
Output in Benchmark period 
 P value P value summary 
Period 1 0.0966 No 
Period 2 0.2491 No 
Period 3 0.3118 No 
Period 4 0.0237 * 
Period 5 0.0262 * 
Period 6 0.0008 *** 
Period 7 0.0019 ** 
Period 8 0.0003 *** 
Period 9 0.0001 *** 
Period 10 0.0005 *** 
Period 11 0.0002 *** 
Period 12 0.0005 *** 
Period 13 0.0007 *** 
Period 14 0.0001 *** 
Period 15 0.0018 *** 
Period 16 0.0023 ** 
Period 17 0.0004 *** 
Period 18 0.0013 ** 
Period 19 0.0006 ** 
Period 20 < 0.0001 *** 
 
 
Table A.1 Unpaired t test for output in Benchmark period EU method vs. Amended EU method degree of 


























Unpaired t test (two-tailed) EU method vs. Amended EU method 
Efficiency Level in Benchmark period 
 P value P value summary 
Period 1 0.8241 No 
Period 2 0.5372 No 
Period 3 0.0001 *** 
Period 4 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 5 0.0003 *** 
Period 6 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 7 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 8 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 9 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 10 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 11 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 12 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 13 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 14 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 15 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 16 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 17 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 18 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 19 < 0.0001 *** 
Period 20 < 0.0001 *** 
 
 
Table A.2 Unpaired t test for efficiency level in Benchmark period EU method vs. Amended EU method 


























Test Value = 35.11 
 
Output in Benchmark period EU 
method 
 













Period_1 -2.810 63 0.007 -4.360 -7.461 -1.259 
Period_2 1.128 63 0.264 1.562 -1.206 4.330 
Period_3 0.596 63 0.553 0.953 -2.240 4.145 
Period_4 2.270 63 0.027 3.734 0.447 7.021 
Period_5 1.488 63 0.142 2.562 -0.880 6.003 
Period_6 2.290 63 0.025 4.374 0.557 8.192 
Period_7 2.103 63 0.040 3.828 0.190 7.465 
Period_8 2.691 63 0.009 5.793 1.492 10.095 
Period_9 3.113 63 0.003 6.484 2.322 10.645 
Period_10 3.008 63 0.004 7.359 2.471 12.247 
Period_11 2.884 63 0.005 6.648 2.042 11.253 
Period_12 2.924 63 0.005 5.921 1.874 9.968 
Period_13 2.690 63 0.009 5.287 1.359 9.215 
Period_14 3.049 63 0.003 6.407 2.208 10.607 
Period_15 3.276 63 0.002 7.473 2.915 12.031 
Period_16 3.023 63 0.004 6.492 2.200 10.783 
Period_17 3.165 63 0.002 7.449 2.746 12.153 
Period_18 2.610 63 0.011 6.293 1.475 11.111 
Period_19 2.716 63 0.009 6.968 1.842 12.094 
Period_20 3.917 63 0.000 10.781 5.281 16.280 
 
 
Table A.3 One-sample test for output in Benchmark period EU method with test value 35.11. P value 























One-Sample Test (Excluding extreme outputs of 100) 
Test Value = 35.11 
 
Output in Benchmark period EU 
method 
 













Period_1 -2.810 63 0.007 4.360 -7.461 -1.259 
Period_2 1.128 63 0.264 1.562 -1.206 4.330 
Period_3 -0.050 62 0.960 -0.062 -2.569 2.444 
Period_4 2.048 62 0.045 2.763 0.066 5.460 
Period_5 0.540 61 0.591 0.551 -1.489 2.592 
Period_6 1.498 60 0.139 1.398 -0.469 3.265 
Period_7 1.518 61 0.134 1.858 -0.589 4.305 
Period_8 1.992 60 0.051 2.887 -0.013 5.786 
Period_9 2.847 59 0.006 2.590 0.769 4.411 
Period_10 1.849 58 0.070 2.483 -0.205 5.172 
Period_11 1.823 58 0.074 1.712 -0.168 3.592 
Period_12 2.444 60 0.017 3.021 0.549 5.494 
Period_13 2.279 61 0.026 3.364 0.412 6.317 
Period_14 2.633 59 0.011 2.508 0.602 4.414 
Period_15 2.742 58 0.008 2.607 0.704 4.510 
Period_16 2.431 59 0.018 2.598 0.460 4.737 
Period_17 2.266 58 0.027 2.582 0.301 4.862 
Period_18 1.119 58 0.268 1.327 -1.047 3.702 
Period_19 1.320 58 0.192 2.059 -1.065 5.184 
Period_20 2.758 55 0.008 3.051 0.834 5.268 
 
 
Table A.4 One-sample test for output in Benchmark period EU method with test value 35.11 after 
























Test Value = 31.3 
Output in Benchmark period Amended EU 
 













Period_1 1.368 63 0.176 2.841 -1.308 6.990 
Period_2 2.299 63 0.025 3.888 0.509 7.266 
Period_3 2.717 63 0.008 3.727 0.986 6.467 
Period_4 2 63 0.05 3.052 0.002 6.101 
Period_5 1.562 63 0.123 2.098 -0.586 4.783 
Period_6 1.579 63 0.119 1.389 -0.369 3.147 
Period_7 1.83 63 0.072 1.655 -0.152 3.462 
Period_8 2.142 63 0.036 1.627 0.109 3.144 
Period_9 2.448 63 0.017 1.925 0.354 3.496 
Period_10 3.682 63 0 2.628 1.202 4.054 
Period_11 2.847 63 0.006 1.881 0.561 3.202 
Period_12 3.064 63 0.003 2.388 0.830 3.945 
Period_13 2.751 63 0.008 2.169 0.593 3.744 
Period_14 2.401 63 0.019 1.755 0.294 3.215 
Period_15 2.745 63 0.008 3.505 0.954 6.056 
Period_16 2.41 63 0.019 3.091 0.528 5.653 
Period_17 3.224 63 0.002 2.677 1.018 4.335 
Period_18 2.686 63 0.009 2.280 0.584 3.976 
Period_19 2.314 63 0.024 1.827 0.249 3.404 
Period_20 3.464 63 0.001 2.623 1.110 4.137 
 
 
Table A.5 One-sample test for output in Benchmark period Amended EU method with test value 31.3. P 

























Test Value = 3 
Efficiency level in Benchmark period 
   













Period_1 -2.517 63 0.014 -0.758 -1.360 -0.156 
Period_2 -1.069 63 0.289 -0.444 -1.273 0.386 
Period_3 -1.578 63 0.119 -0.555 -1.257 0.148 
Period_4 -3.719 63 0.000 -0.820 -1.261 -0.380 
Period_5 -4.854 63 0.000 -1.025 -1.447 -0.603 
Period_6 -3.343 63 0.001 -0.841 -1.343 -0.338 
Period_7 -3.406 63 0.001 -0.783 -1.242 -0.324 
Period_8 -2.332 63 0.023 -0.630 -1.169 -0.090 
Period_9 -1.254 63 0.215 -0.430 -1.115 0.255 
Period_10 -1.527 63 0.132 -0.528 -1.219 0.163 
Period_11 -0.419 63 0.677 -0.178 -1.028 0.672 
Period_12 -0.163 63 0.871 -0.083 -1.098 0.932 
Period_13 -0.288 63 0.774 -0.142 -1.129 0.845 
Period_14 -1.877 63 0.065 -0.623 -1.287 0.040 
Period_15 -0.939 63 0.351 -0.369 -1.153 0.416 
Period_16 -0.621 63 0.537 -0.252 -1.061 0.557 
Period_17 -1.882 63 0.064 -0.661 -1.363 0.041 
Period_18 -1.288 63 0.202 -0.506 -1.292 0.279 
Period_19 -1.130 63 0.263 -0.402 -1.112 0.309 
Period_20 -1.160 63 0.251 -0.419 -1.140 0.303 
 
 
Table A.6 One-sample test for efficiency in Benchmark period Amended EU method with test value 3. P 



























Unpaired t test (two-tailed) EU method vs. Amended EU method 
Output in ETS period 
 P value P value summary 
Period 1 0.8218 No 
Period 2 0.1578 No 
Period 3 0.4435 No 
Period 4 0.2554 No 
Period 5 0.2545 No 
Period 6 0.8874 No 
Period 7 0.9288 No 
Period 8 0.5213 No 
Period 9 0.5268 No 
Period 10 0.3824 No 
Period 11 0.2196 No 
Period 12 0.0912 No 
Period 13 0.1301 No 
Period 14 0.4664 No 
Period 15 0.3941 No 
Period 16 0.0148 * 
Period 17 0.2983 No 
Period 18 0.3091 No 
Period 19 0.1796 No 
Period 20 0.1303 No 
 
 




























Unpaired t test (two-tailed) EU method vs. Amended EU method 
Efficiency Level in ETS period 
 P value P value summary 
Period 1 0.3085 No 
Period 2 0.3920 No 
Period 3 0.5740 No 
Period 4 0.4907 No 
Period 5 0.7388 No 
Period 6 0.5898 No 
Period 7 0.9744 No 
Period 8 0.8726 No 
Period 9 0.9824 No 
Period 10 0.6812 No 
Period 11 0.7185 No 
Period 12 0.4842 No 
Period 13 0.9743 No 
Period 14 0.1589 No 
Period 15 0.6115 No 
Period 16 0.1672 No 
Period 17 0.1268 No 
Period 18 0.4906 No 
Period 19 0.9139 No 
Period 20 0.1375 No 
 
 
Table A.8 Unpaired t test for efficiency level in ETS period EU method vs. Amended EU method degree 



























Test Value = 26.7 
Output in ETS period EU method 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper 
Period 1 0.348 63 0.729 0.659 -3.124 4.442 
Period 2 -0.196 63 0.845 -0.278 -3.108 2.552 
Period 3 -0.03 63 0.976 -0.044 -2.944 2.856 
Period 4 -0.993 63 0.324 -1.153 -3.473 1.167 
Period 5 -0.255 63 0.799 -0.247 -2.178 1.684 
Period 6 1.504 63 0.138 1.550 -0.510 3.610 
Period 7 0.909 63 0.367 0.980 -1.174 3.134 
Period 8 0.037 63 0.971 0.034 -1.844 1.913 
Period 9 1.524 63 0.133 1.456 -0.454 3.366 
Period 10 2.357 63 0.022 1.988 0.303 3.672 
Period 11 2.293 63 0.025 2.238 0.288 4.187 
Period 12 2.846 63 0.006 3.816 1.136 6.495 
Period 13 3.693 63 0 2.784 1.278 4.291 
Period 14 1.886 63 0.064 1.316 -0.078 2.709 
Period 15 1.742 63 0.086 1.347 -0.198 2.892 
Period 16 4.484 63 0 2.794 1.549 4.039 
Period 17 2.121 63 0.038 1.550 0.089 3.011 
Period 18 3.166 63 0.002 2.378 0.877 3.879 
Period 19 3.032 63 0.004 2.503 0.853 4.153 
Period 20 2.708 63 0.009 2.378 0.623 4.133 
 
 
Table A.9 One-sample test for output in ETS period EU method with test value 26.7. P value greater than 



























Test Value = 26.7 
Output in ETS period Amended EU method 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper 
Period 1 0.036 63 0.971 0.066 -3.586 3.718 
Period 2 1.633 63 0.107 3.058 -0.684 6.800 
Period 3 0.985 63 0.329 1.675 -1.724 5.074 
Period 4 0.618 63 0.539 0.702 -1.565 2.968 
Period 5 1.194 63 0.237 1.816 -1.223 4.854 
Period 6 1.270 63 0.209 1.341 -0.769 3.451 
Period 7 1.090 63 0.280 1.113 -0.927 3.152 
Period 8 0.964 63 0.339 0.875 -0.940 2.690 
Period 9 0.821 63 0.415 0.663 -0.950 2.275 
Period 10 1.138 63 0.259 0.948 -0.717 2.614 
Period 11 1.097 63 0.277 0.761 -0.625 2.147 
Period 12 1.687 63 0.096 1.222 -0.225 2.669 
Period 13 1.728 63 0.089 1.214 -0.190 2.618 
Period 14 0.831 63 0.409 0.589 -0.828 2.006 
Period 15 0.587 63 0.560 0.433 -1.042 1.908 
Period 16 0.515 63 0.608 0.386 -1.111 1.883 
Period 17 0.352 63 0.726 0.323 -1.513 2.160 
Period 18 1.313 63 0.194 1.181 -0.617 2.979 
Period 19 1.096 63 0.277 0.917 -0.754 2.589 
Period 20 0.952 63 0.345 0.667 -0.733 2.068 
 
 
Table A.10 One-sample test for output in ETS period Amended EU method with test value 26.7. P value greater 















Test Value = 5 
Efficiency level in ETS period EU method 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper 
Period 1 -0.716 63 0.477 -0.563 -2.133 1.008 
Period 2 -4.010 63 0.000 -1.047 -1.569 -0.525 
Period 3 -1.769 63 0.082 -0.602 -1.281 0.078 
Period 4 -4.053 63 0.000 -0.922 -1.376 -0.467 
Period 5 -0.848 63 0.400 -0.313 -1.049 0.424 
Period 6 -0.238 63 0.813 -0.078 -0.734 0.578 
Period 7 -0.697 63 0.488 -0.156 -0.604 0.292 
Period 8 -0.543 63 0.589 -0.133 -0.622 0.356 
Period 9 -0.919 63 0.361 -0.133 -0.422 0.156 
Period 10 -0.072 63 0.943 -0.016 -0.448 0.417 
Period 11 0.480 63 0.633 0.095 -0.302 0.492 
Period 12 -0.397 63 0.692 -0.063 -0.377 0.252 
Period 13 0.424 63 0.673 0.063 -0.232 0.357 
Period 14 -1.321 63 0.191 -0.156 -0.393 0.080 
Period 15 -0.093 63 0.926 -0.016 -0.350 0.319 
Period 16 -1.284 63 0.204 -0.133 -0.340 0.074 
Period 17 -1.459 63 0.150 -0.180 -0.426 0.067 
Period 18 -1.235 63 0.222 -0.217 -0.569 0.134 
Period 19 0.294 63 0.770 0.039 -0.226 0.305 
Period 20 -0.903 63 0.370 -0.141 -0.452 0.171 
 
 
Table A.11 One-sample test for efficiency level in ETS period EU method with test value 5. P value 

























Test Value = 5 
Efficiency level in ETS period Amended EU 
 
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper 
Period 1 -5.126 63 0.000 -1.414 -1.965 -0.863 
Period 2 -1.468 63 0.147 -0.620 -1.465 0.224 
Period 3 -0.814 63 0.419 -0.313 -1.080 0.455 
Period 4 -3.143 63 0.003 -0.702 -1.148 -0.256 
Period 5 -0.899 63 0.372 -0.173 -0.559 0.212 
Period 6 0.538 63 0.593 0.164 -0.445 0.774 
Period 7 -0.569 63 0.572 -0.145 -0.656 0.365 
Period 8 -0.792 63 0.431 -0.188 -0.660 0.285 
Period 9 -0.823 63 0.414 -0.128 -0.439 0.183 
Period 10 0.609 63 0.544 0.094 -0.214 0.401 
Period 11 0.031 63 0.976 0.005 -0.301 0.311 
Period 12 0.587 63 0.559 0.102 -0.244 0.447 
Period 13 0.447 63 0.656 0.056 -0.195 0.308 
Period 14 0.784 63 0.436 0.125 -0.194 0.444 
Period 15 0.635 63 0.528 0.103 -0.221 0.428 
Period 16 1.004 63 0.319 0.278 -0.276 0.832 
Period 17 1.285 63 0.204 0.823 -0.457 2.104 
Period 18 -0.334 63 0.740 -0.053 -0.371 0.265 
Period 19 0.183 63 0.855 0.020 -0.201 0.242 
Period 20 1.205 63 0.233 0.195 -0.129 0.519 
 
 
Table A.12 One-sample test for efficiency level in ETS period Amended EU method with test value 5. P value 




Appendix B: Personal Instruction Sheet 
Personal Instruction Sheet 
 
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Please do not speak to other 
participants. In case you have a question raise your hand please. We will come and help you. 
 
In this experiment, you will repeatedly make decisions. Doing this you can earn money. How 
much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of another participant. 2500 
points in the experiment equal to 1 Singapore dollar. All participants receive the same instruction. 
You are anonymous to us and to other participants during the experiment. You will interact with 
a fixed another participant in this experiment.   
 
In this experiment you represent a firm. You and another firm produce identical products on the 
same market. Costs of your production will depend on the efficiency level and spending on 
coupons. All firms will always have to make one decision, namely which quantity they wish to 
produce and which efficiency level is used in their production in Day 1 and Day 2, respectively.  
 
In Day 1 both firms simultaneously decide which quantity they want to produce and which 
efficiency level they want to use in their production. After both firms make their decision and 
submit to the computer, each firm will be informed about the quantity and the efficiency level of 
the other firm in Day 1. In addition, the profit will be calculated and displayed on the computer.  
 
Different from Day 1, in Day 2 you need some coupons to comply with your production. Firstly, 
in Day 2 you will receive some free coupons which depend on the efficiency level of both firms 
in Day 1. The number of coupons required in your production at Day 2 is depending on your 
choice of your production level and efficiency level in Day 2. (For the method of calculation, 
please refer to Appendix). If the free coupons received from Day 1 are less than the coupons 
required, you need to purchase from the market, and the price is fixed. 
 
Your profit per unit of production will be the difference between the market price and the unit 
cost. Note that you can make a loss, in case the market price is below the unit cost. In addition, 
we will assume all products are completely sold at the market. Your profit per round is, thus, 
equal to the profit per unit multiplied by the total number of units you produced.  
 
In each round the production of both firms will be recorded, the corresponding price will be 
determined and the respective profits will be calculated. (Please refer to Appendix). After that, 
the experiment will move to the second stage, namely Day 2, in which both firms decide (again 
simultaneously) which quantity of output and efficiency level they want to produce in Day 2.  
The following important rule holds: the larger the total quantity produced of both firms, the 
smaller the resulting price. Moreover, the price will be zero if total output exceeds a certain 
threshold. 
 
Moreover, you can first simulate your decision in each production period (Day 1 and Day 2) 
before you take an actual decision. You can do that on the left hand side of your decision screen. 
You simply enter some quantities of production for your firm and the other firm as well as the 
efficiency levels for both firms into the boxes, and then push the button “compute”. At the top 
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left screen of your computer it will then be indicated which profit for you would result.  
 
When you have come to a final decision in a production period, please enter your decision into 
the box on the right hand side of your screen and push the button “OK”. The experiment consists 
of 20 rounds. You will be constantly matched with the same other participant. At the end of each 
period, your will provide the decision made by the other participant in the experiment and 
corresponding profit results from the experiment for you and the other participant.  
 
 
Your profit in Day 1 
[ ] iiijii qeqqq 11111 2)(1001 −+−=π  
Subscript means Day 1 or Day 2 
Superscript  i represents your firm;  j represents your opponent’s firm.  
 
For example, if your production is 10, your opponent production is 20 and your efficiency level 
is 3 and your opponent’s efficiency level is 2.5, your profit in Day 1 will be  
( ) 640607001032102010100 =−=××−×−−
  
Symbol Description  
i
1
π  Your profit in Day 1 
iq1  Your production in Day 1 
jq1  Your opponent production in Day 1 




Your profit in Day 2 






























For example, in Day 2 if your production is 20, your opponent production is 15, your efficiency 
level is 3.5. In addition, in Day 1 your efficiency level is 3 and your opponent’s efficiency level 
is 2.5, then your profit in Day 2 will be 



















Symbol Description  
i
2
π  Your profit in Day 2 
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iq2  Your production in Day 2 
jq2  Your opponent production in Day 2 
ie2  Your efficiency level in Day 2 
ie1  Your efficiency level in Day 1 
je1  Your opponent’s efficiency level in Day 1 
50 Unit price of coupon 
15 Total number of coupons allocated in your firm and your 
opponent firm 
 









iq2  Your production in Day 2 
ie2  Your efficiency level in Day 2 

























iq1  Your production in Day 1 































Day 1: (simulation) 
Calculate your profit by 
simulating your production 
and efficiency and your 
opponent production and 
efficiency level. 
 
Day 1: (Actual input) 
Input your production and 
efficiency level for Day 1 
and wait for your 
opponent’s inputs 
Day 2: (Results display) 
Display the production and 
efficiency level chosen by 
your opponent in Day 1 
 
Display your profit and your 
opponent’s profit 
Day 2: (Simulation) 
Calculate your profit by 
simulating your production 
and technology and your 
opponent production and 
efficiency level. 
Day 2: (Actual input) 
Input your production and 
efficiency level for Day 2 
and wait for your 
opponent’s inputs 
Day 2: (Results display) 
Display the production and 
efficiency level chosen by 
your opponent in Day 2 
 
Display your profit and your 
opponent’s profit 
 
After this round, you will 
proceed back to another 
round and start to play at 
Day 1. 
 




Appendix C: z-Tree Interface 
 (1) 
Current round and total rounds
You can simulate your 
decision in the following boxes
Computer will calculate your 




You can input your actual decision in 












You actual decisions in Day 2 and 









Results of the third round







Appendix D: Mini Test 
Mini Test 
 
1. According to the formula, in Day 1 what is your profit, if your production is 10 and your 
efficiency level is 3 with assumption that your opponent’s production is 20 and efficiency 
level is 2.5?                


























3. What is your profit in Day 2 with the following information 
In Day 1, your efficiency level is 3 and your opponent efficiency level is 2.5 
In Day 2, your production is 20 and your opponent production is 15 
Your efficiency level is 3.5 in Day 2 
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